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"ONE of the fascinating new games being played by some law pro-
fessors and others is to compute the 'box scores' of the votes of justices
of the Supreme Court in various important lines of cases." 1 The pres-
ent article is not intended as an addition to the work of those engaged
in this type of "numbers game". However valuable the statistical
method may be in providing the empirical data which is needed for
clear juristic thinking, it should be obvious that its use as the key to
the working of the highest court must be limited. The fallacy in this
method lies in its single valued criterion of judgment. The Su-
preme Court and its members can be judged intelligently only from a
many-sided viewpoint-not solely from the standpoint of "for" and
"against".2
The work of the Court in a particular field can, however, often be
appraised through the opinions of a single member. This is especially
true when the Justice concerned happens to have established an out-
standing reputation in the field of inquiry before elevation to the high-
est bench. He is then bound to be assigned more than his share of
opinions to write in cases of importance in that field. Or, if he does not
agree with the Court's holding or reasoning in an individual decision,
he will be quick to dissent or concur. An analysis of his opinions should
therefore give a fair cross-section of the work of the Court in the par-
ticular field.
Prior to his appointment as a member of the Supreme Court, Felix
Frankfurter was recognized as an outstanding expert in administrative
law. It is not often that one who has acquired an academic reputation
in a particular field--even one as striking as Professor Frankfurter's-
is able to expound from the august and authoritative position of the
Supreme Court bench the principles he has worked out as a professorial
theorist. But scrutiny of Justice Frankfurter's administrative law
opinions can prove to be more than an exercise in theoretical research.
He has delivered an opinion in most of the important cases in that
field during the past decade. An analysis of his opinions can con-
sequently serve to point up significant recent administrative law de-
velopments. In addition, it should enable one to appraise not merely
the work of the particular Justice but also that of the Court as a whole
in dealing with administrative law problems.
t Assistant Professor of Law, New York University Law School.
1. Note, 36 A.B.A.J. 41 (1950).
2. Id. at 42.
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I. AD ISTRATIVE POWER
Foremost in Justice Frankfurter's administrative law opinions is a
recognition of the place of the administrative process in modem govern-
ment. Modem administrative tribunals, he wrote in an oft-quoted
passage, are the outgrowth of conditions far different from those which
gave rise to the judicial process. "To a large degree they have been a
response to the felt need of governmental supervision over economic
enterprise--a supervision which could effectively be exercised neither
directly through self-executing legislation nor by the judicial process.
That this movement was natural and its extension inevitable, was a
quarter century ago the opinion of eminent spokesmen of the law." 3
A similar approach is apparent in his summary of the development of
the Interstate Commerce Commission. "While the [ICC] had been in
existence since 1887, the enlargement of its powers through the Hep-
burn Act, in 1906, and the Mann-Elkins Act, in 1910, the establish-
ment of similar agencies in many states .. ., the widespread recog-
nition that these specific instances marked a general movement, made
increasingly manifest the place of administrative agencies in enforcing
legislative policies and called for accommodation of the duties en-
trusted to them to our traditional judicial system. This Court 'as-
cribed' to the findings of the Commission 'the strength due to the
judgments of a tribunal appointed by law and informed by expe-
rience.' " 4 And, in like vein, he has referred to the accomplishments of
half a century that have won for the ICC a place in the Supreme Court's
esteem not second to that accorded the lower federal courts.5
As Justice Frankfurter has pointed out, the attitude taken toward
the role of the administrative process is of cardinal significance in
determining the approach taken in particular administrative law cases.
"I think nothing is more important with reference to every one of the
issues . . .---the relation between the administrative and the judici-
ary, the relation between the administrative and the legislative, what
powers may be delegated, what powers should be delegated, what
should be the nature and scope of judicial review, what procedure is
appropriate within the administrative, . . .- every one of those issues
is in the ultimate analysis referable to the attitude you take toward
the necessity of the legal development that we call administrative
law." 6
In the light of his view of that "necessity", it is only natural that
3. Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.
134, 142 (1940).
4. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 137-3 (1939). See
also Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co, 309 U.S. 134,
142 (1940).
5. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, 52 HAv. L. REv. 440, 457
(1939).
6. Frankfurter, Summnation of the Conference, 24 A.B.J. 282,283 (1938).
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Justice Frankfurter should not view jealously exercises of administra-
tive power. To him, judicial and administrative agencies are not to
be regarded as rivals. The problem, as he sees it, is not in terms of
one of the other seeking to take over the field. Judicial law and execu-
tive administration are recognized as complementary, not as compet-
ing, elements of social control. "It will bear repeating," reads his
opinion in the fourth Morgan case, "that although the administrative
process has had a different development and pursues somewhat differ-
ent ways from those of courts, they are to be deemed collaborative
instrumentalities of justice and the appropriate independence of each
should be respected by the other." I
A. DELEGATIONS OF POWER
Validity.-Justice Frankfurter has not delivered any opinions dealing
directly with the validity of delegations of legislative powers to ad-
ministrative agencies. It is not, however, difficult to tell where he
stands. To his mind, the vast delegation of power to the administra-
tive branch is something that inheres "in the very necessities of our
situation." 8 It is not surprising therefore that he has joined with the
Court in upholding grants of authority as against claims of violation
of the maxim against delegation.
That he would do so was apparent from his writings long before he
was appointed to the Court. In 1930, referring to the doctrine of the
separation of powers, upon which the maxim against delegation is
based, he asserted that the "practical demands of government preclude
its doctrinaire application," for "we are dealing with what Madison
called a 'political maxim' and not a technical rule of law." I And he
Went on to mention cases which show that there are necessary areas
of interaction among the departments of government. "Functions have
been allowed to courts as to which Congress itself might have legis-
lated; matters have been withdrawn from courts and vested in the
executive; laws have been sustained which are contingent upon exec-
utive judgment on highly complicated facts. By these means Congress
has been able to move with freedom in modern fields of legislation,
with their great complexity and shifting facts, calling for technical
knowledge and skill in administration. Enforcement of a rigid con-
ception of separation of powers would make modern government
impossible." 10
Such refusal to invalidate legislation merely because it in form del-
egates legislative power to administrative authorities is to be expected.
7. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941). See, similarly, United States
v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287, 295 (1946).
8. Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 284.
9. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 77 (1930).
10. Id. at 78.
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The approach to the delegation problem has shifted from one of formal
application of an inflexible maxim to one of determining whether the
legislative grant of power is in fact inordinate. And, with this, the
focus of judicial inquiry has centered upon the adequacy of the stand-
ards contained in enabling legislation.
Stanzdards.-Under American theory, grants of authority to the exec-
utive branch must be limited by prescribed standards. The discretion
conferred must not be so wide that it is impossible to discern its limits.
There must be an ascertainable legislative intent to which the exer-
cise of the delegated power must conform. To this extent only is
there meaning in the maxim against delegation-that delegation must
not amount to an abdication of the legislative function.
Recent statutes hence generally make use of broad, general stand-
ards rather than prescriptions of detail. It has been felt that if the
legislature were required to specify in minute detail the course to be
followed by the administrative agency, much of the advantage of
delegation would be lost. Justice Frankfurter is in the forefront of
those on the bench who have taken a liberal attitude toward this
type of standard. This can be seen from his opinions dealing with
grants of power under the Communications Act of 1934. 11
Under that Act, the Federal Communications Commission is given
wide authority to regulate radio broadcasting. "The Commission was,
however, not left at large in performing this duty. The touchstone
provided by Congress was, the 'public interest, convenience, or ne-
cessity,' a criterion which 'is as concrete as the complicated factors for
judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit.' " 12 In a
field where the subject-matter of regulation is as fluid and dynamic
as radio, a detailed prescription of standards could have made
effective administration impossible. Congress would have frustrated
"the purposes for which the Communications Act of 1934 was brought
into being by attempting an itemized catalogue of the specific man-
ifestations of the general problems for the solution of which it was
establishing a regulatory agency. That would have stereotyped the
powers of the Commission to specific details in regulating a field of
enterprise the dominant characteristic of which was the dominant
pace of its unfolding." 13
The generality of the phrasing in a statute such as the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 does not, in Justice Frankfurter's view, mean that
the applicable standards are too vague to canalize administrative dis-
cretion effectively. The statutory language is not to be read in a vac-
uum; a general standard may be given specific form and content when
11. 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (Supp. 1949).
12. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,216 (1943).
13. Id. at 219. Compare Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,
313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
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looked at in the light of the statutory scheme and its background.
Thus the standard of "public interest" in the Communications Act is
not so vague and indefinite as to be unconstitutional. "It is a mis-
taken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare
without any standard to guide determination. The purpose of the Act,
the requirements it imposes, and the context of the provision in ques-
tion show the contrary." 14
Implied powers.--His belief that administrative agencies must be made
adequate instruments for expressing the social policies which they were
set up to further,'" has led Justice Frankfurter to imply authority
beyond that literally conferred by the legislature. Enabling legislation,
in his view, should be construed as conferring upon the agency con-
cerned those powers which are necessary and proper to the adminis-
tration of the act, unless there is an express legislative preclusion of the
particular power. This is illustrated by his opinion in Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.1 The question at issue was
whether section 10(c) of the Wagner Act, 17 in giving the NLRB author-
ity to require an employer guilty of unfair labor practices to desist and
to take such affirmative action "including reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay" as will effectuate the policies of the Act, was
to be construed as limiting the affirmative power of the Board to
ordering the reinstatement of employees.
Justice Frankfurter held that the grant of authority under section
10(c) included the power to require any affirmative action which might
be necessary to effectuate the policies of the Labor Act. "Attainment
of a great national policy through expert administration in collabora-
tion with limited judicial review must not be confined within narrow
canons for equitable relief deemed suitable . . . in ordinary private
controversies. " 18 The power conferred was not to be limited to the
illustrative case of reinstatement of employees which is given in sec-
tion 10(c). "To attribute such a function to the participial phrase
introduced by 'including' is to shrivel a versatile principle to an illus-
trative application. We find no justification for attributing to Congress
such a casuistic withdrawal of the authority which, but for the illus-
tration, it clearly has given the Board." 11
A similar approach is apparent in National Broadcasting Co. v.
14. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226, quoting Hughes,
C.J., in New York Cent. Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932). For
a more recent illustration of Justice Frankfurter's attitude, see Secretary of Agriculture
v. Central Roig Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604, 611-12 (1950).
15. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 122 (1930).
16. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
17. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1947).
18. 313 U.S. at 188.
19. Id. at 189.
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United States,2 which upheld the Chain Broadcasting Regulations
promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission, as against
the claim that they were ultra vires the Communications Act. The reg-
ulations at issue provided, in general, that no licenses were to be granted
to stations or applicants having specified relationships with broad-
casting networks. Each regulation was directed at a particular practice
found by the Commission to be detrimental to the "public interest."
It is clear that the enabling Act did not expressly confer upon the FCC
what in effect amounted to regulatory authority over the business
methods of licensees.2 1 Yet the majority opinion by Justice Frank-
furter refused to restrict the agency to authority expressly delegated.
"We would be asserting our personal views regarding the effective
utilization of radio were we to deny that the Commission was entitled
to find that the large public aims of the Communications Act of 1934
comprehend the considerations which moved the Commission in
promulgating the Chain Broadcasting Regulations. True enough,
the Act does not explicitly say that the Commission shall have power
to deal with network practices found inimical to the public interest.
But Congress was acting in a field of regulation which was both new
and dynamic. . . . In the context of the developing problems to
which it was directed, the Act gave the Commission not niggardly but
expansive powers." 22
In other words, as Justice Frankfurter sees it, a regulatory enact-
ment wherein Congress recites a broad policy in light of which the
specific provisions of the regulatory scheme must be construed gives
rise to a very different duty of construction than do statutes defining
specific crimes. In the latter situation, there is no background of broad
policy to guide a court in its duty of giving the act its easy, most nat-
ural meaning. In a regulatory statute like the Communications Act,
a particular power derives meaning from the broad policy expressed.2 3
In such cases, the detailed effectuation of the legislative policies must
be left to the agency concerned. "In the nature of things Congress
could not catalogue all the devices and stratagems for circumventing
the policies of the Act. Nor could it define the whole gamut of remedies
to effectuate these policies in an infinite variety of specific situations.
Congress met these difficulties by leaving the adaptation of means to
end to the empiric process of administration." 24
20. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
21. Justice Murphy, dissenting, maintained that to uphold the regulation was "gratui-
tously [to] bestow upon an agency power which Congress has not granted." Id. at 227.
22. Id. at 218-19.
23. Paraphrasing Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 352 (1945) (dissenting opin-
ion). Compare Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U.S. 607, 616-618 (1944),
where Justice Frankfurter used a different approach in construing a regulatory statute
which did not contain broad prescriptions.
24. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
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It must be admitted that the above approach toward administrative
exercises of delegated powers contains within it certain dangers.
Professor Frankfurter was among those who saw this. While empha-
sizing the need for a liberal view on administrative exercises of del-
egated authority, he was careful to warn that "the power which must
more and more be lodged in administrative experts, like all power, is
prone to abuse unless its exercise is properly circumscribed and zeal-
ously scrutinized. For we have greatly widened the field of admin-
istrative discretion and thus opened the doors to arbitrariness." 2
If Mr. Justice Frankfurter appears on occasion to have lost sight of
this caution, it must be remembered that, at least in his early years
on the bench, his approach was affected less by the fear of adminis-
trative abuse than by that of administrative ineffectiveness. "In this
country we have been so anxious to avoid the dangers of having the
expert on top that we suffer from a strong reluctance to have him on
tap." 26 And if, before his appointment to the Court, he could assert
that the dominant feeling about government was distrust,27 he has
done his best to replace that feeling with one of confidence. "We must
assume that an agency which Congress has trusted is worthy of the
trust. . . . We must view what the Commission has done with a
generous and not a jealous eye." 2
B. PROCEDURE
In an appraisal of Justice Cardozo's contributions to public law,
Professor Frankfurter placed emphasis upon Cardozo's insistence
upon those procedural safeguards which give historic basis to due
process. "But insistence on procedural regularity was not, for Cardozo,
an expression of inhospitality to the process behind the development
of administrative law. . . . Cardozo was not imprisoned by the tags
and rags of learning, for he was guided by understanding of the cir-
cumstances summarized in historic clich6s and by philosophic insight
into their significance. Thus he never forgot that forms are related to
functions; that court procedures not expressive of ultimate liberties
are not necessarily norms of universal applicability; that practices of
administration may have a momentum of rationality; and that ac-
tivities of government which are not the immediate province of courts
ought not to be circumscribed by formalities historically appropriate
to courts." 29
25. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GovERNMENT 157-8 (1930). See, similarly,
Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 614, 618 (1927).
26. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 161 (1930).
27. Id. at 3.
28. Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S.
239, 264 (1943) (dissenting opinion). See similarly, Ashbacker Radio Co. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 326 U.S. 327, 336 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
29. Frankfurter, supra note 5, at 457-9.
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As is often the case with such writings, they are a mirror more of the
views of their author than of their subject. "Unlike courts, which are
concerned primarily with the enforcement of private rights," said
Justice Frankfurter in the KOA case, " . . . administrative agencies
are predominantly concerned with enforcing public rights although
private interests may thereby be affected. To no small degree ad-
ministrative agencies for the enforcement of public rights were es-
tablished by Congress because more flexible and less traditional pro-
cedures were called for than those evolved by the courts. It is therefore
essential to the vitality of the administrative process that the pro-
cedural powers given to these administrative agencies not be confined
within the conventional modes by which business is done in courts." 0
It is a corollary to this attitude that Justice Frankfurter's primary
emphasis be placed on ensuring that the administrative process is not
hampered in developing the flexibility which he feels to be necessary
for its effective functioning. The administrative branch, in his view,
must be afforded a large measure of autonomy in procedural matters.31
It is not for the courts to invalidate agency procedures merely because
they differ in certain respects from those followed in the courtroom, for
differences in origin and function may preclude the wholesale trans-
plantation of judicial procedures.3 2 "To assume that the modes famil-
iar to courts . . . are the only permissible modes . . . is to read the
discretion given to the [agency] to fashion a procedure relevant to the
interests for the adjustment of which it was established through the
distorting spectacles of what has been found appropriate for courts." 11
Right to be heard.-With the need for procedural autonomy as his
starting point, it is not surprising to find Justice Frankfurter seeking
in some instances to uphold agencies which appear to have violated
the "fundamentals of fair play" that "require that interested parties
be afforded an opportunity for hearing." 3.1 Even in such cases, he
would argue, the agency must be given a wide range of choice and the
Court should not imply hampering restrictions not imposed by Con-
gress. 
5
30. Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 239,
248 (1943) (dissenting opinion). See Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307
U.S. 125, 138-9 (1939).
31. See Frankfurter & Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1932, 47 HARv. L. REv. 245, 282 (1933), where emphasis is placed on the leaving of rules
of procedure before administrative tribunals largely to administrative discretion.
32. Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.
134, 143 (1940).
33. Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S.
239, 264 (1943) (dissenting opinion). See similarly Ashbacker v. United States, 326 U.S.
327, 335 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
34. Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.
134, 143-4 (1940).
35. Ashbacker Radio Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 326 U.S. 327, 335
(1945) (dissenting opinion).
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The KOA case 36afforded an opportunity for expressing this attitude
in dissent. Respondent radio station was licensed to operate at Denver
on a certain frequency. Station WHDH, with a license to operate on
the same frequency from Boston, but only during the daytime, applied
to the Federal Communications Commission for an increase in power
and for operation unlimited in time. Respondent petitioned to in-
tervene in this proceeding, but its petition was denied. The Commis-
sion, after a hearing in which respondent was permitted to file briefs
and present an oral argument arnicus curiae, granted the WHDH appli-
cation. Thereupon respondent appealed, contending that it was en-
titled as a matter of right to participate in the hearing on the question
of the granting of WHDH's application, and that its rights in this
respect were not satisfied by permitting it to file a brief and present
argument. The majority of the Court agreed with these contentions.
Justice Frankfurter dissented in a strongly worded opinion.3" "In
my judgment the decision of the Court in this case imposes a hamper-
ing restriction upon the functioning of the administrative process.
This is the aspect that lends this case importance and leads me to
express the reasons for my dissent." 38 The key statutory provision
was section 312 (b) of the Communications Act 39 which, after giving
the FCC authority to modify station licenses, went on to provide that
"no such order of modification shall become final until the holder of
such outstanding license .. . shall have been notified in writing of
the proposed action and the grounds or reasons therefor and shall have
been given reasonable opportunity to show cause why such an order
of modification should not issue." The grant of WHDH's application,
in the circumstances, necessarily involved the modification of re-
spondent's outstanding license. 0 The question was thus posed whether
Congress intended by section 312 (b) to require a hearing in which the
licensee whose interests might be aggrieved was entitled to intervene
as a formal party.
Justice Frankfurter was of the view that the section could not be so
construed in the absence of express provision for a hearing in the stat-
ute. "The requirement of notice and an opportunity to show cause is
not the equivalent of the requirement of a 'hearing.' " 41 One wonders,
however, whether Justice Frankfurter, in construing the statute in
this manner, is not himself employing the type of formalistic approach
which he has so often condemned. "Certainly one who is to be notified
36. Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 239
(1943).
37. Id. at 248. Douglas, J., also dissented.
38. Ibid.
39. 48 STAT. 1086 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 312 (b) (Supp. 1949).
40. See 319 U.S. at 244.
41. Id. at 263. See also his dissent on a similar point in Ashbacker Radio Co. v.
Federal Communications Commission, 326 U.S. 327, 334 (1945).
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of a hearing and to have the right to show cause is not to be considered
a stranger to the proceeding but is, by the very provisions of the
statute, to be made a party. . . A licensee cannot show cause unless it
is afforded opportunity to participate in the hearing, to offer evidence,
and to exercise the other rights of a party." 42
His predilection in favor of administrative procedural autonomy
has not, however, led Mr. Justice Frankfurter to overlook the position
of private persons in cases directly involving their personal interests.
In such cases, safeguarding the fundamentals of fair play is at least as
important for him as promoting administrative efficiency. Thus, his
dissent in the KOA case, which involved only the property interests
of respondent, should be compared with his more recent dissent in
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,4 3 an alien exclusion case.
The question there was whether the United States could exclude with-
out hearing, solely upon a finding by the Attorney General that her
admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States,
the alien wife of a World War II veteran. The Xar Brides Act of 1945 44
provided that such an alien spouse was to be allowed to join her citizen
husband "if otherwise admissible under the immigration laws." The
issue was whether this phrase indicated a Congressional intent to sub-
ject such war brides to the authority given to the President in 1941 15
to impose additional restrictions and prohibitions on the entry into
and departure of persons from the country during the national emer-
gency.4 6 Among the restrictions imposed had been one which provided
that an alien might be denied a hearing where the Attorney General
determined that the alien was excludable under the regulations on the
basis of information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which
would be contrary to the public interest. It was under this that peti-
tioner was excluded without a hearing. As interpreted by the ma-
jority of the Court, the relevant statute had authorized such action.
"This is not the way to read such legislation," asserted Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, in dissenting from the decision. "It is true also of Acts of
Congress that 'The letter killeth.' Legislation should not be read in
such a decimating spirit unless the letter of Congress is inexorable.
.. . [L]aws are not to be read as though every i has to be dotted and
every t crossed." 41 Yet this kind of literal approach is precisely that
42. 319 U.S. at 246. One wonders whether the Court has not moved tow%-ard Justice
Frankdurter's view in the KOA type of case in Federal Communications Commission v.
WJR, 337 U.S. 265 (1949), opinion per Rutledge, J.
43. 338 U.S. 537 (1950), opinion per Mlinton, J.
44. 59 STAT. 659 (1945), 8 U.S.C.A. § 232 (Supp. 1949).
45. 55 STAT. 252 (1941), 22 U.S.C.A. § 223 (Supp. 1949).
46. The Court held that this provision was still applicable, since "the national emer-
gency has never been terminated." 338 U.S. at 546.
47. Id. at 548. Jackson, J., also dissented, in an opinion joined in by Black and
Frankfurter, J.
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which Justice Frankfurter himself used in holding that the private
party was not entitled to a hearing in the KOA case. In both cases,
it should be noted, the private party was seeking to avail himself of
a privilege which had been conferred by the legislature. An alien's
opportunity of entry into the country, as Justice Frankfurter, himself,
conceded,4" is just as much a privilege which Congress may grant or
withhold as is a radio station license. In the Knauff case, however, a
personal interest of the petitioner was involved. In such a case, Justice
Frankfurter is not willing to interpret the relevant legislation as
authorizing summary administration unless Congress has spoken
explicitly. Reversing his approach in the KOA case, he would require
that a hearing be afforded in the absence of an express statutory pro-
vision for summary action. Even an apparent authorization is to be
narrowly construed. For here "the deepest tie that an American sol-
dier could form may be secretly severed on the mere say-so of an of-
ficial, however well-intentioned. Although five minutes of cross-
examination could enable the soldier-husband to dissipate seemingly
convincing information affecting the security danger of his wife, that
opportunity need not be accorded." '1
Bias.-In two opinions, Justice Frankfurter has dealt with claims of
bias in administrative hearing or deciding officers. In the fourth
Morgan case,50 the charge of bias was based upon a letter written by
the deciding official-the Secretary of Agriculture, who had fixed the
rates to be charged by respondent market agencies-to the New York
Times immediately following the decision in the second Morgan case,5'
where the Secretary's order in the same proceeding had been upset by
the Court for procedural defects. In this letter, the Secretary vigor-
ously criticized that decision. The letter, asserted the market agencies,
indicated that the Secretary was biased and could not properly exercise
the quasi-judicial functions conferred upon him by the Packers and
Stockyards Act.
In the absence of further evidence of bias, Justice Frankfurter had
little difficulty in disposing of this claim. "That [the Secretary] not
merely held, but expressed, strong views on matters believed by him
to have been in issue, did not unfit him for exercising his duty in sub-
sequent proceedings ordered by this Court.12 As well might it be argued
that the judges below, who had three times heard this case, had dis-
qualifying convictions. In publicly criticizing this Court's opinion
48. Id. at 549.
49. Id. at 548.
50. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
51. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
52. In his language here, Justice Frankfurter anticipated the decision in Federal Trade
Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 613 (1948). For an interesting English analogy,
see Franklin v. Minister of Town & Country Planning, [1947] 1 All E.R. 396, 398.
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the Secretary merely indulged in a practice long familiar in the long
history of Anglo-American litigation, whereby unsuccessful litigants
and lawyers give vent to their disappointment in tavern or press." 13
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the fourth Morgan, case was followed
by similar disposition of an allegation of bias on the part of an N\TLRB
trial examiner. In National Labor Relations Board v. Donnelly Garment
Co., 54 proceedings before the NLRB had resulted in a cease and desist
order against the employer. Review of this order came before the
Circuit Court of Appeals, which found that the employer had been
denied a fair hearing in not being allowed to present certain testimony,
and remanded the case to the Board. 5 The NLRB then set the case
for a second hearing before the original examiner, whom the employer
insisted was biased because of his prior findings against it. The Board
denied a motion for a new examiner. The Court of Appeals held that
the denial was improper, pointing out the unfairness of trying issues
of fact to those who may have prejudged them.-" The Supreme Court,
through Justice Frankfurter, reversed, asserting that the rule applied
below was far stricter than the principles governing disqualification
in judicial proceedings. "We find no warrant for imposing upon ad-
ministrative agencies a stiffer rule, whereby examiners would be disen-
titled to sit because they ruled strongly against a party in the first
hearing." 57
The problem involved in the fourth Morgan and Donnelly cases is
essentially that of a claimed prejudgment of the issues by an admin-
istrative trier of fact. Such prejudgment is normally not enough to
disqualify a judge in a court of law." One may, it is true, disagree with
the basis of the judicial rule on the ground that one who has already
come to a decision with regard to a particular issue cannot dispose of
that issue with that "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" of which
Burke speaks. But if, as is clearly the case, it is uniformly held that
mere prejudgment does not disqualify in judicial proceedings, there
is, in Justice Frankfurter's phrase, no warrant for imposing a stricter
standard upon the administrative judge.
Process of decision.-In the Donnelly case, the NLRB order was orig-
inally denied enforcement because of the Board's refusal to allow the
employer to present certain testimony. On remand, the examiner
heard some of the proof rejected in the earlier proceeding, but declined
53. 313 U.S. at 421.
54. 330U.S.219 (1947).
55. Donnelly Garment Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 123 F.2d 215 (8th Cir.
1941).
56. Id.; 151 F.2d 854, 870 (8th Cir. 1945).
57. 330 U.S. at 236-7.
58. See Schwartz, Disqualification for Bias in the Federal District Courts, 11 U. oF
Prrr. L. Rm. 415, 419 (1950).
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to hear the rest on the ground that it would be merely cumulative.
On review of the Board's second order, the lower court concluded that
neither the examiner nor the Board took the new testimony into
account in reaching the findings on which the second order was based.
Primarily on that basis, the court held that a full hearing was denied.
Justice Frankfurter, in reversing, held that this conclusion was wholly
unwarranted, in view of the Board's statement in its decision that it
had carefully considered "all of the evidence." "It is a grave respon-
sibility," the opinion asserts, "to conclude that in admitting the
testimony of the Company's employees, the Board went through a
mere pretense of obedience to the Court's direction, and heard the
testimony with a deaf ear and a closed mind. In light of the authority
with which Congress has endowed the Board, and with due regard to
the conscientiousness which we must attribute to another branch of the
Government, we cannot reject its explicit avowal that it did take into
account evidence which it should have considered unless an examina-
tion of the whole record puts its acceptance beyond reason." 11
Justice Frankfurter's refusal in the Donnelly case to go beyond the
administrative decision to determine whether the deciding officials
had actually considered all of the evidence which had been presented
at the hearing follows naturally from his decision in the fourth Morgan
case."0 In the first Morgan case,61 decided a few years before justice
Frankfurter's appointment to the bench, the Court had laid down the
rule that an administrative decision is invalid unless the deciding
official has considered the evidence and arguments which have been
presented by the parties. "That duty [i-e. of decision] cannot be
performed by one who has not considered evidence or argument. It
is not an impersonal obligation. It is a duty akin to that of a judge.
The one who decides must hear." 62
In subsequent proceedings concerning the validity of the rates which
had been fixed in the Morgan proceedings, the district court authorized
the market agencies to interrogate the Secretary of Agriculture to
determine whether he had complied with the "one who decides must
hear" principle of the first Morgan case. He was questioned at length
regarding the process by which he had reached the conclusions of his
order, including the manner and extent of his study of the record and
his consultation with subordinates. Justice Frankfurter, in the fourth
Morgan case, held that this type of interrogation of a deciding official
was improper. "The short of the business is that the Secretary should
never have been subjected to this examination. . . .Such an exam-
ination of a judge would be destructive of judicial responsibility ...
59. 330 U.S. at 229.
60. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
61. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
62. Id. at 481.
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Just as a judge cannot be subjected to such a scrutiny .. .so the
integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected." C'
In effect, Justice Frankfurter's holding on this point destroys the
efficacy of the principle of the first Morgan case. Unless the private
party is permitted to examine the deciding official on his decision proc-
ess, it is difficult to see how he can possibly prove his claim that the
one who decided did not hear."4 There are, however, strong con-
siderations on the other side. It has been argued that if the Secretary
"were to give to every order which he signs the consideration which
the [first] Morgan case requires, he would probably have to devote all
his time to the conduct of matters which must be considered petty
from a national viewpoint." 6 But if the mental processes of the Sec-
retary could be probed in later court proceedings, he would then most
certainly not have the time which Morgan I requires. Most of his
time would be occupied in judicial proceedings to determine whether
he had actually complied with the principle of the first Morgan case.
From a practical point of view, Justice Frankfurter's position in
Morgan IV and the Donnelly case thus seems justified. A reviewing
court cannot probe the mental processses of an administrative tribunal
any more than it can that of a trial court. Its function is to determine
whether the evidence in the record supports the agency findings, not
to determine whether the agency in fact considered that evidence.
"According to an early English judge, 'The devil himself knoweth
not the mind of man,' and a modem reviewing court is not much better
equipped to lay bare unexposed mental processes." CO
C. FINDINGS
Our analysis thus far has indicated that Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
recognition of the place of the administrative process has made him
not unsympathetic to agency claims based upon the need for effective
administration. He has been quick to imply powers which could be
considered necessary for the effectuation of legislative policies, and he
has urged the desirability of conceding to the administrative branch
authority to determine its own procedures, even if they be at variance
with those followed by the judicial process. But his very recognition
of the administrative role and the need for the delegation of wide
authority to enable that role properly to be performed has led him to
place increasing emphasis in recent years upon the manner in which
administrative power is exercised.
63. 313 U.S. at 422.
64. See Note, 36 COL. L. REv. 1156, 1157 (1936).
65. Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Adminsistratie' Last, 47 YAIza
L.J. 647, 662 (1938).
66. National Labor Relations Board v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219, 229
(1947).
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Justice Frankfurter's opinions dealing with the need for findings in
administrative decisions are of especial significance in this respect.
The very complexity of the technical tasks entrusted to administrative
agencies requires that they formulate the basis of their determinations.
As early as the Phelps Dodge case, Justice Frankfurter insisted that the
"administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity in its ex-
ercise." 65 The demand that agencies articulate the rationale of their
decisions stems from substantially the same considerations that call
for giving reasons in rendering judicial decisions. 9 Those whose
interests are affected have a natural desire to know the reasons which
motivated the administrative decision. This must, in fairness, be
satisfied. Moreover, in Justice Frankfurter's view, of even greater
importance is the fact that articulation of the bases of administrative
decision is essential if the courts are to be enabled adequately to per-
form the review functions which have been delegated to them. "Con-
gress has seen fit to subject to judicial review such orders . . . as the
one before us. That the scope of review is narrowly circumscribed is
beside the point. For the courts cannot exercise their duty of review
unless they are advised of the considerations underlying the action
under review. . . . T]he orderly functioning of the process of review
requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency
acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained." 10
Justice Frankfurter's approach to the findings problem is perhaps
best shown in his dissenting opinion in New York v. United States.
71
The case involved the validity of an interim order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission increasing class rates in the Northeast by 10
per cent and reducing those elsewhere east of the Rockies by 10 per
cent, pending formulation of a national uniform classification. The
Commission's expressed goal was that of national uniformity of classifi-
cation, and the railroads had in fact accepted an invitation to take the
initiative in preparing such a uniform classification. It seemed prob-
able, however, that at least ten years would be needed for the comple-
tion of such classification, and there was, in the meantime, mounting
pressure upon the Commission to eliminate the existing difference
between the Northeastern and the Southern and Western rate levels.
In the face of this pressure, the Commission concluded that pending
completion of the uniform classification certain interim readjustments
could be made which would seek to reduce the existing rate differences.
It was then that it issued the interim order which was in issue. 2
67. Frankfurter, supra note 5, at 458.
68. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941).
69. Eastern-Central Assn. v. United States, 321 U.S. 194, 215 (1944) (dissenting
opinion).
70. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
71. 331 U.S. 284 (1947).
72. For a good discussion of the case, see Jaffe, Administrative Findings or the Alneer
in America, 34 CoRN. L. Q. 473, 481 (1949).
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In dissenting from the Court's decision upholding the order,"
Justice Frankfurter stated that he relied principally upon the fact
that there were no detailed findings to support the agency action.
This was especially true in regard to the raising of the Northeastern
rates by a flat 10 per cent, for there was no finding that the existing
rates in that area were unreasonable. One feels from Justice Frank-
furter's opinion that he fears that the Commission in its order sought
a convenient way of eliminating immediately 20 per cent of the exist-
ing discrimination against the Southern and Western rates. "The
Procrustean bed," he asserts, "is not a symbol of equality. . . . The
findings do not reveal how it happened that putting 10% on and
taking 10% off respectively will beget just the right adjustment." 74
Justice Frankfurter, it should be noted, is not saying here that there is
nothing in the record to support the ICC view. It was to avoid the
need for a detailed probing of the record that the requirement of find-
ings was imposed. "It is not conducive to a fair administration of the
Interstate Commerce Act, nor is it consonant with the proper discharge
of this Court's task, to require us to dig out indications or evidence
giving appropriate answer to these issues from a record consisting of
nearly 13,000 pages spread over 21 volumes, which led to a report by
the Commission of 320 pages." 1-
"Administrative experts," Justice Frankfurter concludes, "no
doubt have antennae not possessed by courts charged with reviewing
their action. And so it may well be that to the expert feel the justifi-
able correction of an unbalance between [Northeastern] rates and the
rates [elsewhere] is a shift of 10% in the respective rates.&-[Northeast-
em] rates increased 100 and rates elsewhere decreased 10%. But
courts, charged as they are with the review of the actions of the Com-
mission, ought not to be asked to sustain such a mathematical coin-
cidence as a matter of unillumined faith in the conclusion of the
experts." 76
It should not be thought from the foregoing that Mr. Justice Frank-
furter has insisted on findings purely for their own sake as a formalistic
requirement in every case. That his rationale is no modem revival of
the spirit of a Baron Parke 77 is shown by his dissent in Yonkers v.
United States.78 The ICC has statutory power to authorize a railroad
to abandon any portion of its line,79 but this power does not extend to
street, suburban, or interurban electric railways which are not operated
as part of a general steam railroad system. The Commission authorized
73. 331 U.S. at 351.
74. Id. at 353.
75. Id. at 353-4.
76. Id. at 357.
77. Paraphrasing Frankfurter, mipra note 5, at 458.
78. 320 U.S. 685 (1944).
79. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 (18) (22) (Supp. 1949).
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the abandonment of an electric branch line without stating in its
order whether the line came within the statutory exception. For that
reason the Court held the order invalid; an express finding by the Com-
mission that the line came within the statutory limits was essential
to its exercise of jurisdiction, and therefore the absence of such a
finding necessitated the setting aside of the order. Justice Frankfurter
dissented." A jurisdictional finding such as the one involved was
implicit in the very taking of action by the agency. The Commission
would not have acted if it had not first determined the jurisdictional
fact to its satisfaction. "The Commission may very well now formally
make such a finding . . ., which in fact is writ large in the Commis-
sion's report in granting the application for abandonment, and the
weary round of litigation may be repeated to the futile end of having
this Court then, forsooth, express an opinion on the merits opposed
to that of the Commission and the District Court. This danger if not
likelihood of thus marching the king's men up the hill and then march-
ing them down again seems to me a mode of judicial administration
to which I cannot yield concurrence." 81
The weight of reason would seem to be with Mr. Justice Frankfurter
here. The requirement of findings stems from the need for courts to
know what it is that the agency has really determined in order that
they may know what to review.82 There is surely no lack of such
judicial knowledge in the Yonkers case. "Is not insistence on such an
empty formalism a reversion to seventeenth century pleading which
required talismanic phrases . .. ?" 83
II. JUDICIAL POWER
If the basic principle in Justice Frankfurter's administrative law
philosophy has been his recognition of the place of the administrative
process in modern government, of no less importance has been his
insistence upon the restricted role of the courts in reviewing agency
action. "In endowing this Court with 'judicial power,' " he asserted
soon after his appointment to the bench, "the Constitution presupposed
an historic content for that phrase and relied on assumption by tile
judiciary of authority only over issues which are appropriate for dis-
position by judges." 84 In his view, "courts are not charged with
general guardianship against all potential mischief in the complicated
80. 320 U.S. at 692, joined in by Reed and Jackson, J.J.
81. Id. at 693-4.
82. Id. at 694.
83. Id. at 698. Other cases showing that Justice Frankfurter's attitude on findings is
not unduly rigid are Interstate Commerce Commission v. Mechling, 330 U.S. 567, 583
(1947) (dissenting opinion) ; Eastern-Central Ass'n v. United States, 321 U.S. 194, 212
(1944) (dissenting opinion).
84. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939).
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tasks of government." s5 The judicial function is a more limited one.
Judicial power, however large, has an orbit more or less strictly de-
fined 5 It "could come into play only in matters that were the tra-
ditional concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose
in ways that to the expert feel of lawyers constituted 'Cases' or 'Contro-
versies.' . . . [Elven as to the kinds of questions which were the staple
of judicial business, it was not for courts to pass upon them as abstract,
intellectual problems but only if a concrete, living contest between
adversaries called for the arbitrament of law." 81
As Justice Frankfurter sees it, the insistence upon the presence of
an actual controversy as a prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power
is of fundamental significance. "One of the greatest sources of strength
of our law is that it adjudicates concrete cases and does not pronounce
principles in the abstract." "I The business of courts is thus adjudica-
tion, not speculation. They are concerned with actual living contro-
versies, and not abstract disputation. 9
Emphasizing as he does the importance of judicial self-limitation,
Justice Frankfurter has been cautious in his approach to cases pre-
senting problems of judicial review of administrative action. He has
constantly urged the need for the courts to deal directly with the par-
ticular case and to avoid over-hasty abstractions." "Certainly the
recent growth of administrative law counsels against generalizations
regarding what is compendiously called judicial review of agency action.
And so we deem it desirable, in a case like this, to hug the shore of the
precise problem before us in relation to the provisions of the particular
Act immediately relevant." 91
Justice Frankfurter's views on this point were well stated in an
address delivered in 1938. "I think it is inevitable that you must be
85. Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.
134, 146 (1940). Compare Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining Co., 338
U.S. 604, 618 (1950).
86. Frankfurter & Fisher, The Busiess of the Supreme Court at the October Termnr,
1935 and 1936,51 HARv. L. Rv. 577, 621 (1938).
87. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939).
88. New Yorkv. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575 (1946).
89. Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 86. Compare Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory
Opinions, 37 llARv. L. REv. 1002 (1924). Recent indications of Justice Frankfurter's
hostility to judicial abstractions are contained in United States v. Congress of Industrial
Organizations, 335 U.S. 106, 124 (1948) (concurring opinion) ; Central Greyhound Lines
v. Mfealey, 334 U.S. 653, 655 (1948); Republic Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 67
(1948).
90. Compare Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 62, 705 (1949) (dissent-
ing opinion), where Justice Frankfurter recognizes that judicial generalizations are some-
times necessary.
91. United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287, 295 (1946). Compare Oklahoma v. Civil
Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 147 (1947) (concurring opinion), varning against
premature construction of the Administrative Procedure Act.
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in an intellectual fog thus far,-I am not saying what may happen
eventually,-if you talk about 'judicial review' in the abstract. The
English are so hopeful that they think they can do something eventu-
ally about the fog of London. Certainly, we are in the fog of 'judicial
review.' I think we are in the fog of inadequate experience, we are
as yet in a totally inadequate stage for suggesting wholesale remedies
or large systems." 92
A. AVAILABILITY OF REVIEW
Silence of Congress.-With his conception of the judicial function
in controlling the other branches of government as a limited one, it is
not surprising that Justice Frankfurter has been the least disposed, of
all the Justices on the Court, to imply rights of review. 3 As he sees
the problem of the availability of review over administrative action,
the judicial authority in particular cases depends upon Congressional
delegation of the review power. "When judicial review is available and
under what circumstances, are questions . .. that depend upon the
particular Congressional enactment under which judicial review is
exercised." 11 It follows from this that unless there is an express statutory
provision for review, access to the courts is not available in the par-
ticular case.
If, as Justice Frankfurter pointed out in the Scripps-Howard case,
the "search for significance in the silence of Congress is too often the
pursuit of a mirage," 11 he himself has on occasion not been averse to
engaging in such pursuit. For, in dealing with the question of the avail-
ability of review, he has started with the proposition that the silence
of Congress indicates an intent to preclude review. "To ascertain
whether an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission is open to
judicial review, it should rigorously be borne in mind that jurisdiction
to review such an order must have been conferred by Congress. To
assume that an order of the Commission for which reviewing power is
not conferred is presumably reviewable by the courts is to start with
the answer of the problem to be solved. Unless Congress has chosen to
give the courts oversight of a determination by the Commission, the
courts have not the power of oversight where, as here, the Constitu-
tion does not require it." 96
92. Frankfurter, Summation of the Conference, 24 A.B.A.J. 282, 285 (1938). See,
similarly, Frankfurter, The Task of Adininistrafive Law, 75 U. op PA. L. REv. 614, 619-
20 (1927).
93. See Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 62 HAnv. L. Rv.
353, 372 (1949) ; PRrrcHETr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT 194 (1948).
94. National Labor Relations Board v. Cheney Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385, 388 (1946).
95. Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal Communications Commission, 316 U.S. 4, 11
(1942).
96. United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 337 U.S. 426, 449 (1949) (dis-
senting opinion). On the other hand, where Congress has not been silent, Justice Frank-
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In his constant adherence to this principle, Justice Frankfurter has
usually not had the concurrence of a majority of the Court. The case
which, perhaps, best illustrates how Justice Frankfurter's approach
differs from that of most of the Justices is Stark v. Wickard57 The
Secretary of Agriculture, acting under the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937,98 had promulgated an order regulating the
marketing of milk in the Greater Boston area. The order provided for
fixing minimum prices to be paid to producers, and the prescribed
formula authorized a deduction for certain payments to cooperatives.
Producers, claiming that promulgation of the deduction provision
was beyond the Secretary's statutory power, brought suit in the dis-
trict court to enjoin him from carrying out the challenged portion of the
order. The majority of the Court, through Justice Reed, held that the
suit could be maintained even conceding that there was no direct
judicial review granted by this statute for these proceedings.3
Justice Frankfurter dissented.' As he saw the case, the majority
of the Court was adding to what Congress had written a provision for
judicial relief of producers.' 0 ' But "provision for judicial remedies for
. . . producers is significantly absent. Such omission is neither in-
advertent nor suprising. It would be manifestly incongruous for an
Act which provides that no order shall be directed at producers 102 to
give to producers the right to attack the validity of such an order in
court. To create a judicial remedy for producers when the statute
gave none is to dislocate the Congressional scheme of enforcement." 103
In limiting the availability of review to cases where there are express
statutory review provisions, 0 4 Justice Frankfurter would seem to
furter has insisted that the courts must exercise the review power conferred. Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
97. 321 U.S. 288 (1944).
9& 50 STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U.S.C.A. § 601 (1939).
99. 321 U.S. at 308.
100. Id. at 311. Black, J., also dissented.
101. Id. at 319.
102. Under the Act, the price orders of the Secretary were directed only to mill:
handlers. But, since it is clear that the order at issue did reduce the amount which the
producers received for their product, Justice Frankfurter's emphasis on this point would
seem to rely on the form rather than the substance of the order.
103. 321 U.S. at 317. In Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 32-0 U.S.
297 (1943), opinion per Douglas, J., the Court appears to have adopted Justice Frank-
furter's approach in Stark v. Wickard. Justice Reed, who had delivered the Stark
opinion, dissented. On the other hand, in the more recent case of United States v. Inter-
state Commerce Commission, 337 U.S. 426, 444 (1949), Justice Frankfurter again found
himself in dissent from the Court's holding that review was available in the absence of
statutory provisions therefor. See also his concurring opinion in Estep v. United States,
327 U.S. 114,134 (1946), where he differed from the Court on this point.
104. Justice Frankfurter has applied this principle even in a case involving interests
of the person. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948), where he spoke for a bare
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be restricting the judicial role unduly. Even in the absence of statutory
review provisions, the Anglo-American courts have developed means
for controlling administrative action. As stated in a leading English
case, an administrative tribunal "is not an autocrat free to act as it
pleases, but is an inferior tribunal subject to the jurisdiction which the
Court of King's Bench for centuries, and the High Court since the
Judicature Acts, has exercised over such tribunals." 10 The mere fact
that one starts in a particular case with a statute which makes no pro-
vision for judicial review is not decisive. "For the silence of Congress
as to judicial review is not necessarily to be construed as a denial of the
power of the Federal courts to grant relief in the exercise of the general
jurisdiction which Congress has conferred upon them." 10
The review power of the courts in these cases is an inherent one which
arises out of the delegation to them of the "judicial power" under the
Constitution. "When Congress passes an Act empowering administra-
tive agencies to carry on governmental activities, the power of those
agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted. This permits the
courts to participate in law enforcement entrusted to administrative
bodies only to the extent necessary to protect justiciable individual
rights against administrative action fairly beyond the granted powers.
The responsibility of determining the limits of statutory granti of
authority in such instances is a judicial function entrusted to the courts
by Congress by the statutes establishing courts and marking their
jurisdiction." 107
Yet under Justice Frankfurter's view, in the absence of statutory
review provisions, an admin'strative order is final and not reviewable
by any court even though entered arbitrarily, without substantial
supporting evidence, and in defiance of law. "Such a sweeping con-
tention for administrative finality is out of harmony with the general
legislative pattern of administrative and judicial relationships." 103
The need for judicial control such as that exercised by the majority
of the Court in Stark v. Wickard has been emphasized in strong language
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. "If the judi-
ciary had no power in such matter, the only practical restraint would
be the self-restraint of the executive branch. Such a result is foreign
to our concept of the division of the powers of government." 109
majority of the Court. The Court there appears to have been influenced by the fact that
the authority concerned was vested in the President and related to the field of foreign
affairs, as it did in Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103
(1948), another case of implied preclusion of review.
105. Rex v. Board of Education, [1910] 2 K.B. 165, 178.
106. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 120 (1946), per Douglas, J.
107. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944).
108. United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 337 U.S. 426, 433-4 (1949),
per Black, J.
109. Fleming v. Moberly Milk Products Co., 160 F.2d 259, 265 (App.D.C. 1947).
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Reviewable action.-Influenced by his strong feeling that the courts
are not charged with the minute supervision of everything done by
the administrative branch, Justice Frankfurter has been careful to
limit the types of agency action which could be reviewed. His approach
to the question of what kinds of agency action are reviewable has not,
however, been a formalistic one. His first important administrative
law opinion, Rochester Telephwne Corp. v. United States,"0 formulated
the principle that the availability of review in a given case does not
depend upon the form of the particular agency action. Concurrently,
it struck down the so-called "negative order" doctrine, a limitation
upon the availability of review which had been based wholly upon the
form of administrative action. In Justice Frankfurter's view, a for-
malistic concept such as that of negative orders has not served to clarify
the relations between administrative bodies and the courts, but has
rather tended to obscure them. "'Negative' has really been an obfus-
cating adjective in that it implied a search for a distinction-non-action
as against action-which does not involve the real considerations on
which rest . . . the reviewability of Commission orders within the
framework of its discretionary authority and within the general
criteria of justiciability." 111
Whether particular administrative action is reviewable depends
upon whether such action is "final." Agency action is clearly not
"final" in a given case if the private party has not complied with the
rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Of course,
that rule only applies in cases where there is, in fact, an administrative
remedy to exhaust-it presupposes that "administrative remedies as a
condition to judicial relief are not rendered futile and nugatory." 112
But if he finds that an administrative remedy is available which has
not been pursued, Justice Frankfurter does not hesitate strictly to
apply the exhaustion rule. In United States v. Ruzicka," 3 the Govern-
ment brought suit under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
to enforce an order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture requiring
110. 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
111. Id. at 141. His rejection of formalism here has also appeared to influence Justice
Frankfurter in his constant opposition to what is still a formidable barrier to access to
the courts in some cases-i.e., the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 705 (1949) (dissenting opinion) ; Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. Tax Commission, 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946) (dissenting opinion) ; Great Northern Ins.
Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 57 (1944) (dissenting opinion) ; Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
112. United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 739 (1944). Justice Frankfurter appears to
have lost sight of this principle in his dissent in Order of Railway Conductors v. Svan,
329 U.S. 520, 530 (1947), where he asserted that the e.'-haustion rule precluded resort to
the courts even in a case where a jurisdictional frustration on the administrative level
made impossible the effective use of the administrative remedy.
113. 329 U.S. 287 (1946).
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handlers of milk to pay money into a Producer-Settlement Fund.
Defendant handlers sought to justify their failure to pay on the
ground that the demand was based upon faulty inspection of their
accounts and improper tests of their milk and milk products. Under
the Act," 4 defendants could have sought a hearing before the Sec-
retary on their petition to modify or be exempted from the order. If
their petition was denied, review could then be had in the federal
courts.
Justice Frankfurter held that, since defendants had not taken ad-
vantage of the administrative remedy provided by the statute, they
could not now assert their objections to the order. It made no differ-
ence that this was an enforcement proceeding at the suit of the Govern-
ment rather than a review action brought by the private party. "It
is suggested that Congress did not authorize a district court to enforce
an order not 'in accordance with law.' The short answer to this rather
dialectic point is that whether such an order is or is not in accordance
with law is not a question that brings its own immediate answer, or
even an answer which it is the familiar, everyday business of courts
to find. Congress has provided a special procedure for ascertaining
whether such an order is or is not in accordance with law. . . .Con-
gress has provided that the remedy in the first instance must be
sought from the Secretary of Agriculture." 115
To say that administrative remedies must be exhausted does not,
however, solve the problems of whether particular agency action is
"final" action subject to review. As Justice Frankfurter aptly pointed
out in a decision dealing with a related matter,"1 no self-enforcing
formula defining when an order is final can be devised." 7 One thing is
clear in his approach to the problem. If his opinions often appear un-
duly to restrict the availability of review, he is motivated by what he
believes to be the practical necessities of proper judicial administra-
tion. "The considerations that determine finality are not abstractions
but have reference to very real interests-not merely those of the
immediate parties but, more particularly, those that pertain to the
smooth functioning of our judicial system." 118
In the Rochester Telephone decision, Justice Frankfurter referred
to cases where the agency order did not in itself affect complainant, but
only affected his rights adversely on the contingency of future admin-
istrative action. "In view of traditional conceptions of federal judicial
power," he said, "resort to the courts in these situations is either pre-
114. 7U.S.C.A.§608(c)(15) (1939).
115. 329 0.S. at 294.
116. Whether a judgment was "final" within the meaning of § 237 of the Judicial Code
(now § 1257 of the Revised Code of 1948).
117. Republic Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 67 (1948).
118. Id. at 69.
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mature or wholly beyond their province." 119 Yet, as he has recognized,
there have been instances where the courts have entertained review
of an order that might otherwise be deemed interlocutory, because the
controversy had proceeded to a point where the losing party would be
irreparably injured if review were unavailable.I°'
In Columbia Broadcasting Systen v. United States, 21 the appellant
sought review of the Chain Broadcasting Regulations promulgated by
the Federal Communications Commission. The regulations in question
provided that no licenses were to be granted to stations or applicants
having specified contractual relationships with broadcasting networks.
Appellant was a network organization whose business depended upon
the maintenance and renewal of contracts such as those against which
the instant regulations were directed. It was argued that the order
promulgating the regulations was not reviewable, for in and of them-
selves they did not purport to affect the contract rights of appellant
or its affiliate stations. They merely laid down principles to govern
future action of the Commission. Their effect was thus contingent
upon FCC action in future license application or renewal cases, and
it was only when the Commission acted in such a case in conformity
to the regulations that its action was reviewable.
This argument was rejected by Mr. Chief Justice Stone, speaking
for the majority of the Court, but it was adopted in a lengthy dissent-
ing opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. 12 2 "The regulations them-
selves," he states, "determine no rights. They alter the status of neither
the networks nor licensees. As such they require nobody-neither
the networks, the licensees, nor the Commission-to do anything.
They are merely an announcement to the public of what the Commis-
sion intends to do in passing upon future applications for station li-
censes. . . . It is only after a proceeding has been started . ..and
adversely concluded against a party that legal sanctions come into
play-the Commission can bring proceedings to enforce its order of
revocation and, correspondingly, the licensee can bring suit...
challenging the validity of the Commission's termination of the li-
cense." 123
One wonders, however, whether Justice Frankfurter's opinion does
not lose sight of the realities of the particular factual situation. It is
to deal in abstract legal learning rather than the realities of the rec-
ord 124 to assert that appellant was not adversely affected by the order
promulgating these regulations. Such a claim loses sight of the im-
119. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 130 (1939).
120. Republic Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62,68 (1948).
121. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
122. Id. at 429, joined in by Reed and Douglas, J.J.
123. Id. at 430-31, 437.
124. Paraphrasing Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314 U.S. 63,69 (1941).
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mediate effect upon appellant's contractual relations with its affiliates.
For knowledge that contracts such as those they had with appellant
would result in a refusal to renew their station permits, would lead
the affiliates to repudiate the contracts rather than run the risk of
losing their licenses. "If the regulations are valid they alter the status
of appellant's contracts and thus determine their validity in advance
of such [renewal] proceedings. By striking them down by a determina-
tion proclaimed in advance that licenses shall be cancelled or refused
because of a previous failure to comply with the regulations, they
impose a penalty and sanction for non-compliance far more drastic than
the fines customarily imposed for breach of reviewable administrative
orders." 125
Appellant's rights were affected more immediately than by the
mere contingency of future administrative action. It is true, as Justice
Frankfurter pointed out, that licensees who regarded the regulations
as invalid were free to continue their existing contracts and to challenge
the regulations when the Commission refused to renew their licenses
and that the network could intervene in the renewal proceeding.12 0
But is it not more likely that there would never be such a challenge
by a licensee in a renewal proceeding, for to make the challenge
would be to chance losing its license? The licensees were "free only
in the sense that all those who do not choose to conform to regula-
tions which may be accepted to be lawful are free by their choice to
accept the legal consequences of their acts. Failure to comply with the
regulations entails such consequences to the station owner and to
appellant. These are the loss of the affiliated stations' licenses if they
adhere to their contracts, and disruption of appellant's network through
the declared unlawfulness of the contracts, if the regulations are
valid." 127
Justice Frankfurter has adhered to the views expressed by him in the
Columbia Broadcasting case in his more recent opinion in Eccles v.
People's Bank,"12 though this time with the concurrence of a majority
of the Court. The respondent bank had been granted membership in
the Federal Reserve System subject to a condition which provided
for withdrawal from membership within 60 days after written notice
from the Board of Governors if a named corporation or any of its
affiliates thereafter acquired any interest in the bank without the
approval of the Board. Respondent claimed that the imposing of this
condition was beyond the powers of the Board of Governors and
sought a declaratory judgment to that effect.
125. Stone, C.J., in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418
(1942).
126. Id. at 445.
127. Stone, C.J., id. at 419.
128. 333 U.S. 426 (1948).
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Justice Frankfurter, this time speaking for the Court, held that the
bank's action was premature; respondent could not in any way be
affected by the administrative action at issue before the Board of
Governors commenced revocation proceedings for a violation of the
condition. "The Bank seeks a declaration of its rights if it should lose
its independence or if the Board of Governors should reverse its policy
and seek o invoke the condition even though the Bank remains in-
dependent. . . .The concurrence of these contingent events, nec-
essary for injury to be realized, is too speculative to warrant antic-
ipatory judicial determinations." 122
What has been said above with regard to the Columbia Broadcasting
case would appear to apply with equal force to Eccles v. People's Bank.
Review should be afforded at this stage under the analysis in Mr.
Chief Justice Stone's opinion in Columbia Broadcasting System v.
United States "a case where prematurity was clearer than here." 110
"It seems obvious that the requirement was a restriction on the mar-
ket for respondent's stock and therefore detrimental to the conduct of
its business, a continuing threat of the Board to exclude respondent
from the benefits of the System." 1 31 It is all very well to argue, as
Justice Frankfurter does, that respondent is not actually injured until
the Board moves to revoke its membership for a violation of the con-
dition. But, in a practical sense, does not that make it most difficult
for respondent to obtain a judicial determination of the vires of the
condition? At that later stage, it could only secure that determination
at the risk of losing its membership, if the condition were held to be
w*thin the Board's authority.
Standing.-Under Justice Frankfurter's approach to the question of
the availability of review, the "standing" of a private party to chal-
lenge particular administrative act:on is dependent upon whether a
statute has given him such standing. The reliance upon statute does
not, however, produce an automatic answer in any given case. As
pointed out by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, "proposals to define the class of persons who can attack
acts of administrative agencies in general are either futile or dangerous:
Futile because they can hardly go beyond the present generality of
persons 'aggrieved' or 'adversely affected' or otherwise having 'legal
standing'; dangerous if they go beyond it, unless the redefinition is
based on detailed consideration of the specific judicial determinations
made in the particular situation." 132
Most of the statutory provisions concerning standing have conse-
129. Id. at 432.
130. Reed, J., dissenting, id. at 437. It should be noted that Justice Reed had joined
in Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the Columbia Broadcasting case.
131. Id. at 435.
132. REP. ATT'Y GEN. 85 (1941).
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quently gone no further than to authorize review to be sought by per-
sons "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" by the agency action. These
statutory provisions in and of themselves give little aid in determining
whether a private party has standing to attack particular administra-
tive action. "Of course, such words as 'aggrieved' and 'adversely
affected,' . . . in a statute governing a particular agency, do not
provide solutions for problem cases. The solution must be found in
broader indications of legislative policies concerning interests to be pro-
tected, and, when legislative expression is unclear, in the policy ideas
of courts." 133
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has applied such statutory provisions con-
cerning standing strictly against the private party seeking review. This
can be illustrated by his dissenting opinion in the KOA case, 134 which
has already been discussed insofar as the right to be heard before the
agency is concerned.13 5 It will be recalled that, in that case, respondent
station KOA challenged an order of the Federal Communications
Commission which granted an application for an increase in power
and for operation unlimited in time to a station operating on the same
frequency as respondent. The relevant statutory provision "0 provided
for an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
such cases by an applicant whose application was refused or by "any
other person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by
any decision of the Commission granting or refusing any such ap-
plication."
The majority of the Court held that KOA had standing under this
provision. "It would be anomalous if one entitled to be heard before
the Commission should be denied the right of appeal from an order
made without hearing. . . . In view of the fact that § 312(b) grants
KOA the right to become a party to the proceedings, we think it plain
that it is a party aggrieved, or a party whose interests will be adversely
affected by the grant of WHDH's application." "I
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, disagreed with this construction of
the standing provision of the Communications Act. "It must not be
concluded that anyone who claims to be 'aggrieved' or who is any way
adversely affected by Commission action has a right to appeal." ' As
he read the statute, "KOA had to make a showing that its interests
were substantially impaired by a grant of the WHDH application.
133. Davis, Standing to Challenge and to Enforce Administrative Action, 49 Col. L.
REv. 759, 768 (1949).
134. Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 239,
248 (1943).
135. See pages 1236-7 supra.
136. 47 U.S.C.A.§402(b) (Supp. 1949).
137. 319 U.S. at 246-7, per Roberts, J.
138. Id. at 260.
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This, the record makes clear, it failed to do. In its notice of appeal to
the court below, KOA made only a general allegation . .. that the
Commission's action resulted in a 'substantial modification' of its
license. No supporting allegations of fact were tendered." 1
The holding of the majority of the Court in the KOA case appears
to follow logically from its earlier decision in Federal Communications
Commission v. Sanders Radio Station,140 in which Justice Frankfurter
had joined. There the Court had held that a licensee who claimed that
he would be financially injured by the competition resulting from the
grant of a license to another had standing to appeal from an FCC order
granting such license. As Professor Davis has pointed out, KOA's
interest in freedom from electrical interference is at least as deserving
of protection as Sanders' interest in freedom from economic com-
petition. 41 Justice Frankfurter's reading of the Sanders opinion as
requiring by implication that the licensee had to make a showing that
there was probable injury of a "substantial character" 142 may have
been due to his fear that any other rule might unduly hamper judicial
administration. "So much by way of limitation seems necessary to
prevent ...mass appeals by the industry at large, with resulting
hopeless clogging of the administrative process by judicial review." 143
This fear seems largely groundless. "The notion that permitting all
those with substantial interests to get judicial review will flood the
courts with 'hundreds of thousands' of cases was satisfactorily exploded
in an opinion of a lower court which pointed out that the first decision
will to some extent have a stare decisis effect, and that where United
States Courts of Appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review, the
filing of a petition with one court will prevent the other courts from
entertaining a similar petition filed by any other person aggrieved." 144
In a situation like that presented in the KOA case, it is most un-
likely that the FCC order would have ever been brought before the
courts if KOA had not been permitted to challenge it. In a practical
sense, then, such administrative action would be placed in a con-
clusive position, for it would never be challenged by the only other
parties involved, the Commission or the successful applicant. In
view of the role of the courts in our polity in controlling executive
action, it is of the utmost importance that agency action should not
be placed in such a position of finality. In these cases, review should
139. Ibid.
140. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
141. Davis, supra note 133, at 779.
142. Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 239,
260 (1943).
143. Ibid., quoting from the opinion of the court below.
144. Davis, supra note 133, at 793, referring to Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F2d
694, 707 (2d Cir. 1943).
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be made available at the suit of the one party who can challenge the
administrative action. 145 As stated by the Court in the Sanders case,
"Congress had some purpose in enacting § 402(b)(2). It may have
been of opinion that one likely to be financially injured by the issue
of a license would be the only person having a sufficient interest to
bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of law in the action
of the Commission in granting the license." 14
That Justice Frankfurter often tends to lose sight of the need for
making sure that someone can review administrative action is seen
even more clearly in his dissent without opinion in the more recent
case of Parker v. Fleming.14 The Court there held that a tenant could
obtain review of an order of the Price Administrator authorizing his
landlord to begin eviction proceedings, as a person "aggrieved" and
"subject to" the order within the meaning of the statutory provision
governing standing. 14 "If these tenants cannot 'protest' this order
issued under these regulations," asserted Mr. Justice Black, "no one
can; and if they cannot challenge it in the Emergency Court of Appeals,
they cannot effectively challenge it at all." 149
The dissenting Justices, of whom Justice Frankfurter was one, found
it unnecessary to state the reasons for their disagreement with the
Court. As far as Justice Frankfurter is concerned, his dissent here
would appear to follow naturally both from his KOA dissent and from
his general approach to the question of the availability of review. If
he could hold that KOA was not adversely affected by the grant of an
application which could result in interference with its broadcasts, he
should reach the same result insofar as a tenant subject to immediate
eviction would be concerned. Nor would he be deterred by the argu-
ment based upon the dangers of administrative finality. As we have
already seen, his approach to judicial review does not start with a
predilection in favor of the availability of review.
B. SCOPE OF REVIEW
Law-fact distinction. In view of Justice Frankfurter's respect for
administrative expertise and his insistence upon a limited role for the
courts, it is not surprising that he has not joined the ranks of those
seeking to broaden the scope of review over agency action. "Even when
resort to courts can be had to review a Commission's order," reads his
first significant administrative law opinion, "the range of issues open
to review is narrow. Only questions affecting constitutional power,
145. See Note, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 70, 74 (1949).
146. 309 U.S. at 477.
147. 329 U.S. 531, 538 (1947). Vinson, C.J., and Burton, J., also dissented without
opinion.
148. 50 U.S.C.A. ApP. §§ 923,924 (Supp. 1950).
149. 329 U.S. at 537-8.
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statutory authority and the basic prerequisites of proof can be raised.
If these legal tests are satisfied, the Commission's order becomes in-
contestable."15
As Justice Frankfurter sees it, the courts have nothing to do with
the wisdom of challenged administrative action. 13 As expressed by
him in a case where certain regulations were assailed as arbitrary and
capricious, "If this contention means that the Regulations are unwise,
. . . we can only say that the appellants have selected the wrong forum
for such a plea. . . 'We certainly have neither technical competence
nor legal authority to pronounce upon the wisdom of the course taken
by the Commission.' 152 Our duty is at an end when we find that the
action of the Commission was based upon findings supported by evi-
dence, and was made pursuant to authority granted by Congress." 13
Justice Frankfurter's approach to the scope of review is based upon
the well-known distinction between questions of law and questions of
fact. As to the latter, the primary responsibility of decision is with the
administrative expert. It is only the former that are to be decided
judicially. "If the action rests upon an administrative determination-
an exercise of judgment in an area which Congress has entrusted to the
agency-of course it must not be set aside because the reviewing court
might have made a different determination were it empowered to do
so. But if the action is based upon a determination of law as to which
the reviewing authority of the courts does come into play, an order may
not stand if the agency has misconceived the law." 14
If he has felt that the agency concerned has made an error of law,
Justice Frankfurter has not hesitated to set aside its action. Such a
case, in his view, was Federal Trade Commission v. Bu7ne Bros., 5
where the FTC had issued a cease and desist order against so-called
"break and take" sales of candy, which made the amount the pur-
chaser received dependent upon chance. Although the sales took place
wholly within the state of Illinois, the Commission urged that its
statutory authority to prevent "unfair methods of competition in
commerce" included the power to proscribe unfair methods used in
intrastate sales when these resulted in a handicap to interstate com-
petitors. The Court rejected this contention. As justice Frankfurter
saw the problem it was solely one of the meaning of the language of the
FTC Act,15 and the Commission was wrong in its construction. "The
150. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 139-40 (1939).
151. Virginia Electric Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 319 U.S. 533, 546 (1943)
152. Quoting from his own opinion in Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534,
548 (1942).
153. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,224 (1943).
154. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). See
also Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal Communications Commission, 316 U.S. 4, 10 (1942).
155. 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
156. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1941).
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construction of § 5 urged by the Commission would thus give a federal
agency pervasive control over myriads of local businesses in matters
heretofore traditionally left to local custom or local law. . . . An in-
road upon local conditions and local standards of such far-reaching
import as is involved here, ought to await a clearer mandate from
Congress." 157
The result in the Bunte case follows from Justice Frankfurter's
treatment of the question at issue as one of law. The judicial treatment
of a particular finding as one of "law" or "fact" is of cardinal impor-
tance for purposes of determining the scope of review. If it is treated
as one of law, the courts are enabled to exercise a broad reviewing
power; if it is treated as one of fact, judicial review is limited by the
"substantial evidence" rule. The extent of review thus depends upon
which side of the law-fact dividing line the given finding is seen to
fall. Yet, as Justice Frankfurter has recognized, there is great difficulty
in concrete cases in determining on which side of the line a particular
finding falls. The law-fact distinction "is often not an illuminating
test and is never self-executing." 15
Statutory Interpretation.-In the Bunte case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
treated the question of construction of section 5 of the FTC Act as
one of law. On the other hand, he has asserted, on other occasions,
that not all questions involving the interpretation of statutes are to
be treated as questions of law for purposes of the scope of review. As
stated by him in connection with review of decisions of the Tax
Court, 159 "the construction of documents has for historic reasons been
deemed to be a question of law in the sense that the meaning is to be
given by judges and not by laymen. But this crude division between
what is 'law' and what is 'fact' is not relevant to the proper demarca-
tion of functions as between the Tax Court and the reviewing courts.
To hold that the Circuit Courts of Appeals, and eventually this Court,
must make an independent examination of the meaning of every word
of tax legislation, no matter whether the words express accounting, bus-
iness or other conceptions peculiarly within the special competence of
the Tax Court, is to sacrifice the effectiveness of the judicial scheme
designed by Congress especially for tax litigat'on to an abstract
157. Id. at 354. Compare Champlin Rfg. Co. v. United States, 329 U.S. 29, 35 (1946)
(dissenting opinion, per Reed, J., joined in by Frankfurter, J.) ; United States v. American
Union Transport, 327 U.S. 437, 457 (1946) (dissenting opinion) ; Polish Alliance v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, 322 U.S. 643 (1944) ; Jersey Central Co. v. Federal Power
Commission, 319 U.S. 61, 79 (1943) (dissenting opinion, per Roberts, J., concurred in by
Frankfurter, J.).
158. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944).
159. The scope of review over its decisions being the same as in the case of other ad-
ministrative agencies at that time.
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notion of 'law' derived from the merely historic function of courts
generally to construe documents, including legislation." IC
A leading authority on statutory interpretation has divided the
steps in the judicial process of interpreting statutes into three parts:
(1) finding or choosing the proper statute or statutes applicable; (2)
interpreting the statute law in its technical sense; (3) applying the
meaning so found to the case at hand.16 1 On the other hand, it has been
urged that the interpretation and application of statutes are twro
different things. In this view, interpretation properly so called includes
only the determination of the proper sensible meaning of the statute.
Application is the process of determining whether the facts of the
particular case are within or without that meaning. 
1 2
Justice Frankfurter has indicated that he is in accord with the second
of these views on the meaning of statutory interpretation, at least
insofar as the law-fact classification for purposes of the scope of review
is concerned. It is for this reason that he has been such a strong sup-
porter of the doctrine of Dobson v. Comiissioner,113 where, the "Court
made a brave effort ... to meet some of the difficulties of the present
distribution of judicial authority in tax cases by lodging practical
finality in a Tax Court decision unless it involves a 'clear-cut mistake
of law.'" 164 The Dobson doctrine left to the specialized equipment of
the Tax Court and the trained instinct that came from its experience
"the final say . ..as to matters which involved construction of legal
documents and the application of legislation." 165 In doing so, in
Justice Frankfurter's view, it dealt with the practicalities of the
situation instead of relying on the "grab-bag concepts of 'law' and
'fact' as a basis of review." 166
160. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 380 (1945) (concurring opin-
ion).
161. DeSloovare, Steps in the Process of Intcrpreting Statutes, 10 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 1
(1932).
162. Id. at 17.
163. 320 U.S. 489 (1943), opinion per Jackson, J. Justice Frankfurter had anticipated
the Dobson doctrine in Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 331 (1943) (dis-
senting opinion, joined in by Jackson, J.).
164. Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25, 37 (1946) (concurring
opinion).
165. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 381 (1945) (concurring opinion).
166. Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25, 37-3 (1946). Other cases
indicating his adherence to the Dobson doctrine are Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591, 610 (1948) (dissent); Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 742 (1947); Commis-
sioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 292 (1945); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324
U.S. 303, 307 (1945) ; McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 64-5 (1944). Section
1141(a) of the Internal Revenue Code was amended in 1948 so that review of the decisions
of the Tax Court now proceeds in the same manner and to the same extent as review of
decisions of the federal district courts in civil actions tried without a jury. This changes
the rule of the Dobson case, insofar as review of the Tax Court is concerned.
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Justice Frankfurter's views on the question of statutory interpre-
tation have not been limited to the field of tax administration; he has
not hesitated to apply them to other administrative law cases. Thus,
he was an early adherent of Gray v. Powell 167 where, as explained by
Justice Rutledge in a later case, the Court held that though "un-
doubtedly questions of statutory interpretation . . . are for the
courts to resolve. . . . where the question is one of specific application
of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency admin-
istering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's
function is limited." 168 In such cases, the administrative determ na-
tion is to be accepted if it has warrant in the record and a reasonable
basis in law.'69
Mr. Justice Frankfurter had, in fact, anticipated Gray v. Powell
in his opinion in the Rochester Telephone case.'70 Upholding the finding
of the Federal Communications Commission there that Rochester was
under the "control" of another company within the meaning of the
statute and hence subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,
Justice Frankfurter stated that "this is an issue of fact to be determined
by the special circumstances of each case. So long as there is warrant
in the record for the judgment of the expert body it must stand." "I
It must be admitted that under the principle of Gray v. Powell, the
rule that questions of statutory construction are for the courts on
review loses much of its force. This is true even though, strictly speak-
ing, the finding at issue in this type of case involves only the applica-
tion of a statutory term to a particular state of fact. As Justice Frank-
furter has aptly pointed out, "Meaning derives vitality from applica-
tion. Meaning is easily thwarted or distorted by misapplication." 172
It can consequently be argued, for example, that the question of who
is an "employee" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act is a question of the meaning of the Act, and, therefore, is a judicial
and not an administrative question.' 73 There are, indeed, some in-
dications in more recent cases that Justice Frankfurter is tending to-
167. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
168. National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
169. Id. at 131.
170. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
171. Id. at 145-6. See Barrett Line v. United States, 326 U.S. 179, 202 (1945)
(dissenting opinion per Vinson, C.J., joined in by Frankfurter, J.); United States v.
Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 490 (1942) (dissenting opinion per Jackson, J.,
concurred in by Frankfurter, J.), where it was asserted that the majority of the Court
had paid only lip service to the principle of Gray v. Powell.
172. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 380 (1945) (concurring
opinion).
173. Paraphrasing Roberts, J., dissenting, in National Labor Relations Board v.
Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 136 (1944).
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ward this point of view.174 We do not, however, yet have the benefit
of a recent opinion by him indicating whether in fact there has been
any shift in his attitude to the Gray v. Powell type of case.
Jurisdictional fact-The finding at issue in the Gray v. Powell type of
case is not only a finding involving a question of statutory interpre-
tation, but is also a finding of "jurisdictional fact" in the sense that
its presence is a condition precedent to the lawful exercise of ad-
ministrative authority. Thus, in Gray v. Powell, the agency power to act
was dependent upon the finding that the private party was not a
"producer-consumer" within the exemption provisions of the enabling
act, 17' for the statutory price-fixing scheme was not operative in the
absence of such a finding. To apply the normal theory of limited
review to such a case, it can be argued, would run counter to the
general policy of Anglo-American law against allowing inferior tri-
bunals to make a final determination as to their own jurisdiction.
"An agency may not finally decide the limits of its statutory power,"
the Supreme Court has asserted. "That is a judicial function." 170
Where the administrative jurisdiction depends upon a particular
finding, the reviewing court should be able to determine for itself
whether that finding is correct, even though the finding happens to
be one of fact.
Justice Frankfurter has indicated that he is wholly out of sympathy
with attempts to secure broad review based upon this "jurisdictional
fact" doctrine. As he sees it, "analysis is not furthered by speaking of
such findings as 'jurisdictional' and not even when-to adapt a famous
phrase--jurisdictional is softened by a quasi. 'Jurisdiction' competes
with 'right' as one of the most deceptive of legal pitfalls. The opinions
in Crowell v. Benson 7 .. .and the casuistries to which they have
given rise bear unedifying testimony of the morass into which one is
led in working out problems of judicial review over administrative
decisions by loose talk about jurisdiction." 178
Constitutional fact.-The doctrine of "constitutional fact" articulated
174. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Co., 331 U.S. 416, 431
(1947) (dissent); National Labor Relations Board v. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 393, 415
(1947) (dissent); Packard Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 485, 501
(1947) (agreement with dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.), cases which involved the
same finding as that at issue in National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications,
322 U.S. 111 (1944). See also Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 370
(1946) (concurring opinion).
175. Brruaimous CoAL ACr, 50 STAT. 72 (1937), 26 U.S.C.A. §3520 (1940).
176. Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946).
177. 285 U.S. 22 (1932), the leading case applying the jurisdictional fact doctrine.
See Schwartz, Does the Ghost of Crowell v. Benson Still Walk?, 98 U. oF PA. L. REv.
163 (1949).
178. Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 695 (1944) (dissenting opinion). See,
similarly, Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 142 (1946) (concurring opinion).
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in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough "I is the logical fulfillment
of the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine, for, in this country, the ultimate
limits to the lawful exercise of any power are those contained in the
organic instrument. Whenever a constitutional issue is raised, said the
Court in the Ben Avon case, a fair opportunity must be provided "for
submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its
own independent judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise the
order is void because in conflict with the due process clause." "80 To
vest the administrative finding here with finality would be to allow
the administrative body itself to find the facts upon which the con-
stitutional exercise of its authority depends.
The doctrine of "constitutional fact" is but the "jurisdictional fact"
doctrine in special form. It applies to constitutional limitations on
administrative jurisdiction the same reasoning which the doctrine of
jurisdictional fact applies to statutory limitations."'8 In view of Justice
Frankfurter's attitude toward the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine, it is
not surprising that he has displayed the same hostility toward the doc-
trine of "constitutional fact".
The "constitutional fact" doctrine has caused the greatest difficulty
in its application to the field of utility regulation. In 1930, speaking of
the barriers to effective regulation of public utilities, Professor Frank-
furter asserted that the "heart of the difficulty is the current judicial
approach to utility regulation. Out of the constitutional provision
safeguarding property against deprivation 'without due process of
law,' the Supreme Court has evolved a doctrine that a utility is entitled
to a fair return on its present 'value' ".11 Under the well-known
formula of Smyth v. Ames,' in determining the present value of the
utility, account must be taken of the original cost of construction, the
amount invested, and the cost to reproduce the property. And, under
the Ben Avon doctrine the courts on review must determine for them-
selves the correctness of the valuation fixed by the agency. Since the
constitutional issue of due process is involved, there must be full re-
view of both law and fact.
Justice Frankfurter has strongly objected both to the valuation
formula of the Court and to what he has asserted to be unduly broad
judicial review in such cases, where the constitutional issue can always
be raised. The formula of Smyth v. Ames, as he sees it, has met the
rebuff of facts.'84 "No judicial pronouncements upon matters funda-
179. 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
180. Id. at 289.
181. Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determilmtlions
of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. OF PA. L. RE,. 1055, 1072 (1932).
182. FitANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITs GOVERNMENT 101 (1930).
183. 169 U.S. 466,546-7 (1898).
184. Driscoll v. Edison Co., 307 U.S. 104, 123 (1939) (concurring opinion).
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mentally economic run so counter to the views of economists as do the
more recent- utterances of the Supreme Court upon present value.
They are based upon unrealities, are financially unsound, and lead to
uncertainty and speculation." 185
Believing as he did on his elevation to the bench that effective
utility regulation was caught in the quicksands of the judicial doc-
trines of valuation,' Justice Frankfurter took the first occasion
presented to object to the "mischievous formula" of Smyth v. Ames.'-,
"The force of reason, confirmed by events, has gradually been ren-
dering that formula moribund by revealing it to be useless as a guide
for adjudication." 1l And he went on to deny the need for broad
judicial review in these cases. "The determination of utility rates
. . .does not present questions of an essentially legal nature in the
sense that legal education and lawyers' learning afford peculiar com-
petence for their adjustment. These are matters for the application
of whatever knowledge economics and finance may bring to the prac-
ticalities of business enterprise." 189
Since he has gone this far, it would not be difficult for Justice
Frankfurter to take the further step of abandoning broad judicial
review over the constitutional elements involved in utility regulation.
He has, indeed, come close to taking that step in Railroad Commission
of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co."' The case involved the validity
of an oil proration order of the Commission which was challenged as
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the Ben Avon doc-
trine, the validity of the order in such a case was reviewable both as
to the law and facts on the independent judgment of the reviewing
court. But Justice Frankfurter, who delivered the opinion of the Court,
treated this as an ordinary case calling for the application of the rule
of limited review. "A controversy like this always calls for fresh re-
minder that courts must not substitute their notions of expediency and
fairness for those which have guided the agencies to whom the for-
mulation and execution of policy have been entrusted." "I The courts
must thus accept the agency judgment "even in the face of convincing
proof that a different result would have been better." 192 And he
implies that this is so even though a constitutional issue has been
185. FRANKFURmT, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GoVE-NmEvT 103 (1930).
186. Id. at 113.
187. In his concurring opinion in Driscoll v. Edison Co., 307 U.S. 104, 122 (1939).
188. Ibid.
189. Ibid. See, also, on the limited judicial role in rate fixing cases, Board of Trade
v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 546 (1942); United States v. Mforgan, 313 U.S. 409, 417
(1941). But compare Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591, 626-7 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
190. 310 U.S. 573, as amended, 311 U.S. 614 (1940); 311 U.S. 570 (1941).
191. 310 U.S. at 580-81.
192. Id. at 584.
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raised. "Certainly in a domain of knowledge still shifting and grow-
ing, and in a field where judgment is therefore necessarily beset by the
necessity of inferences bordering on conjecture even for those learned
in the art, it would be presumptuous for courts, on the basis of con-
flicting expert testimony, to deem the view of the administrative
tribunal . ..offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment." 193
The opinions in the Rowan & Nichols cases are not very satisfac-
tory insofar as clarifying the present status of the Ben Avon doctrine
is concerned. It seems clear, from the analysis in Justice Roberts'
dissenting opinion in the first case,'94 that Justice Frankfurter's opin-
ion announces principles contrary to those established by the Ben
Avon case. Yet the Ben Avon doctrine is nowhere directly mentioned
by Justice Frankfurter. It is consequently difficult to tell whether the
Rowan & Nichols cases presage a general overruling of Ben Avon or
whether they are to be limited to their particular field. The emphasis
throughout Justice Frankfurter's opinion is on the need for expertise
to solve the peculiar difficulties o" proration, which involve even
more technical and scientific competence than do valuation cases.'
Ben Avon may consequently still have some effect in the field of rate-
making.
III. CONCLUSION
Justice Frankfurter is usually thought of as one of the right-wing
members of the present Court. But it should be borne in mind that
insofar as the field under inquiry is concerned, even so-called conserv-
ative members of this Court are far more friendly toward adminis-
trative authority than were most of the members of its predecessors.
The characterization of a Justice of the present Court as "conserva-
tive" does not, therefore, mean that he is hostile toward the adminis-
trative process. In his acceptance of the place of administrative
expertise and his insistence upon the limitations of judicial control,
Justice Frankfurter has typified the attitude of the Justices of this
Court. It is true that he has been somewhat more narrow in his views
on the availability of review than the rest of the Justices. This has,
however, been due primarily to his notions on the restricted com-
petence of courts where jurisdiction has not been expressly conferred
upon them by the legislature.
On the other hand, where jurisdiction has been granted to the
courts by the Congress, Justice Frankfurter has displayed a .tendency
to insist that the judicial function is more than a perfunctory one.
Thus, in speaking of the judicial enforcement of agency subpoenas,
he has stated that "in the discharge of that duty courts act as courts
193. Id. at 581-2. See, similarly, 311 U.S. at 576.
194. 310 U.S. at 584.
195. See Comment, 39 MIcHa. L. REv. 438, 447 (1941).
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and not as administrative adjuncts. The power of Congress to impose
on courts the duty of enforcing obedience to an administrative sub-
poena was sustained precisely because courts were not to be automata
carrying out the wishes of the administrative. They were discharging
judicial power with all the implications of the judicial function in our
constitutional scheme." 16 And, in dealing with the authority given to
the courts under a statutory review provision, he held that the power
granted carried with it the authority to stay the agency action pending
review, as part of the traditional equipment for the administration
of justice. Judicial review might be an "idle ceremony" if such au-
thority were not implied."'
"How to fit ancient liberties, which have gained a new preciousness,
into solution of those exigent and intricate economic problems that
have been too long avoided rather than faced, is the special task of
Administrative Law," wrote Justice Frankfurter in 1941.'1 He would
be among the first to admit that that task is still, in large measure,
with us. Insofar as he is concerned, the problem has, indeed, become a
more difficult one. For he has come to realize that abdication of the
field to the administrator will not lead to a solution. "It will not do to
say that it must all be left to the skill of experts." " The judiciary,
too, has a role to play. Justice Frankfurter has thus at least in part re-
versed his earlier emphasis on the place of administration. "Courts
no less than adninistrative bodies," he stated significantly in the
Scripps-Howard case, "are agencies of government. Both are instru-
ments for realizing public purposes." 200
196. Penfield Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 330 U.S. 585, 604 (1947)
(dissenting opinion).
197. Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal Communications Commission, 316 U.S. 4, 9-10
(1942).
198. Foreword, 41 CoL L. RE:v. 585, 586 (1941).
199. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 627 (1944)
(dissenting opinion).
200. Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal Communications Commission, 316 U.S. 4, 15
(1942).
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